Sexual-Harassment Liability in 1998: Good News or Bad News for Employers and Employees? by Sherwyn, David & Tracey, J. Bruce
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration 
The Scholarly Commons 
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection 
10-1998 
Sexual-Harassment Liability in 1998: Good News or Bad News for 
Employers and Employees? 
David Sherwyn 
Cornell University, dss18@cornell.edu 
J. Bruce Tracey 
Cornell University, jbt6@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Labor Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sherwyn, D., & Tracey, J. B. (1998). Sexual-harassment liability in 1998: Good news or bad news for 
employers and employees? [Electronic version]. Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 
39(5), 14-21. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Hospitality Administration site: 
http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/394/ 
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection 
at The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized 
administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Sexual-Harassment Liability in 1998: Good News or Bad News for Employers and 
Employees? 
Abstract 
In June 1998 the U.S. Supreme Court issued three separate rulings regarding workplace sexual 
harassment. In an apparent victory for employers, the court ruled in one case that a victim must actually 
suffer a tangible loss (i.e., a demotion or unwelcome transfer) to establish a case for quid pro quo 
harassment. The court affirmed, moreover, that employers can absolve themselves of liability in hostile-
environment cases by establishing a meaningful and effective policy against sexual harassment. Absent 
a meaningful policy, however, employers will be liable for a hostile environment created by supervisors. 
Thus, in another case, the court found an employer liable for workplace harassment because the 
employer pp. 14-21 failed to disseminate its existing policy and to follow its terms. Finally, in a same-sex 
harassment case, the court rejected the notion that egregious sexual harassment is per se unlawful, 
leaving open the possibility that a harasser who treats men and women equally, no matter how badly, 
could be found not guilty of unlawful behavior. Still, the court made it clear that an employer's best 
defense against supervisors' sexual-harassment behavior is an effective prevention policy. Consequently, 
employers should draft a policy that (1) defines sexual harassment; (2) states the company prohibits such 
conduct; (3) provides a clear procedure for submitting claims, including the names of individuals involved 
in the resolution process; (4) states that those who complain or cooperate with an investigation will not 
be retaliated against; and (5) is disseminated to all new employees when they join the company, reissued 
to all employees each year, and posted in a conspicuous location in the workplace. 
Keywords 
U.S. Supreme Court, workplace sexual harassment, same-sex harassment 
Disciplines 
Labor and Employment Law | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/394 
Sexual-Harassment 
Liability in 1998
Good News or Bad News for
Three recent Supreme Court decisions have both clarified and muddied 
the waters surrounding employment-related sexual-harassment cases.
Employers have not, however, been as badly hurt as some analysts
by D avid Sherwyn and 
J. Bruce Tracey have warned.
l  n the first six months o f  1998 the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued three 
landmark decisions that we believe 
will have a profound effect on the 
issue o f workplace sexual harass­
ment. While at first blush the deci­
sions may not seem employer- 
friendly, in fact they can benefit 
those employers who understand 
the decisions’ underpinnings.
In this paper we first examine 
two o f those decisions, Burlington 
Industries v. Ellerth1 and Faragher v.
1 Burlington Industries v. Ellertht 118 S.Ct. 2257 
(1998). *
D avid Sherwyn, J.D ., is an assistant 
professor of law at the Cornell Univer­
sity School of Hotel Administration, 
where J. Bruce Tracey, Ph.D., is 
an assistant professor of operations 
management and human resources.
©  1998, Cornell University
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Boca Raton,2 and show that these 
cases actually limit the liability o f 
employers who establish a meaning­
ful and effective policy against 
sexual harassment. Then we discuss 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,3 
a same-sex harassment case, and 
posit that the court actually created 
a new,“ equal-opportunity harasser” 
defense for employers that, while 
unfortunate, nevertheless establishes 
yet another hurdle that plaintiffs 
must overcome to prevail in court. 
We conclude our analysis by recom­
mending an approach to handling 
sexual-harassment complaints that 
should help employers avoid liability. 
Taken together, these three cases 
demonstrate again the necessity for 
employers to establish and follow 
policies forbidding workplace sexual 
harassment.
Sexual-harassment Liability
N o U.S. law expressly prohibits 
sexual harassment. The statute that 
forms the basis for workplace 
sexual-harassment claims is Title VII 
o f the Civil Rights Act o f  1964.4 
Briefly, Title VII prohibits employ­
ment discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, national origin, and 
sex. In Meritor Savings Bank u Vinson, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
discrimination based on sex includes 
that which today is defined as sexual 
harassment.5 In Meritor the court 
delineated two types o f harassment: 
quid pro quo and hostile environ­
ment. Quid pro quo harassment exists 
when employment conditions are 
contingent on sexual favors. A hos­
tile environment exists when (1) an
2Faragher v. Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998).
3Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 
S. Ct. 998 (1998).
442 U.S.C. 2000(e). (For the layperson, an in- 
depth article on the development o f  sexual- 
harassment case law was published earlier this 
year. See: Jeffrey Toobin,“ The Trouble with 
Sex— Why the Law o f Sexual Harassment Has 
Never Worked,” New Yorker, February 9,1998, 
pp. 48—55.— Ed.)
5Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 
(1986) or 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
employer subjects an employee to 
sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, or other verbal or physical 
conduct o f  a sexual nature; (2) the 
conduct is unwelcome; and (3) the 
conduct was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive6 to alter the conditions o f 
the victims employment and create 
an abusive working environment.7
Liability. One o f the key issues 
in sexual-harassment claims is estab­
lishing liability. The Meritor court 
held that “ agency principles” would 
determine whether the company 
was liable for the actions o f its su­
pervisors. Because that term is so 
vague, however, lower courts that 
must adhere to Meritor have had 
trouble defining44agency principles.” 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme C ourts 
June 1998 decisions, every circuit 
court to address this issue held that 
employers were vicariously liable for 
the conduct o f  supervisors in quid 
pro quo cases.8 Thus, a company was 
liable when a supervisor took tan­
gible actions against an employee 
who refused to submit to the 
supervisors sexual demands.
In hostile-environment cases, 
however, the issue o f vicarious liabil­
ity has not been settled. Instead, 
courts have typically analyzed 
whether supervisors were acting 
within the scope o f employment.9 
While the general rule had been that
6The expression “ severe and pervasive” is 
unclear and was not clarified by 1998s court 
decisions. In a concurrence to Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993) and U.S. Lexis 
7155, Justice Scalia explained that the term  
“ severe and pervasive” does not provide much 
guidance, but that neither he nor the court could 
think o f  anything better.
7Meritor v. Vinson, at 66267, and Ellison v. Brady, 
924 F.2d 872,875-876 (9th Cir., 1998).
8See,for example: Ellerth, at p. 4; Davis v. Sioux 
City, 115 F.3d 1365,1367 (8th Cir. 1997); Nichols 
v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503,513-514 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Bouton v. BM W  of North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 
103,106-107 (3rd Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake 
County, 1 F.3d 1122,1127 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 ,185-  
186 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1041,121 L. 
Ed. 2d 701,113 S. Ct. 831 (1992); and Steele v. 
Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311,1316 
(11th Cir. 1989).
9Faragher, at 8.
sexual harassment is not within the 
scope o f employment (i.e., that it is 
personal in nature and therefore 
unrelated to the supervisor s respon­
sibilities),10 employers could not rely 
on that distinction for protection. 
Even if  the court held that sexual 
harassment is outside the employ­
ment context, an employer could still 
be held liable i f  it knew or should 
have known about the harassment.11 
Thus, employers would find them­
selves litigating over whether they 
knew about harassing behavior.
On the other hand, some courts 
held that a supervisors harassing 
conduct is within the scope o f em­
ployment because such conduct is 
due in part to the legitimate author­
ity associated with the harasser s po­
sition.12 Other courts found that 
certain supervisors held positions so 
high in the company hierarchy that 
their actions were imputed to the 
employer, regardless o f  whether the 
company endorsed the conduct or 
had a policy against it.13
10Ellerth, at 7.
11 See: Faragher, at 5, citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983), which upheld employer 
liability because the “ employer’s supervisory 
personnel manifested unmistakable acquiescence 
in or approval o f the harassment” ; E E O C  v. 
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504,1516 (9th Cir.
1989), which found the employer liable because 
its hotel manager did not respond to complaints 
about supervisors’ harassment; and Hall v. Gus 
Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010,1016 (8th Cir. 
1988), which held the employer liable for harass­
ment by co-workers because the supervisor knew 
o f the harassment but did nothing.
12See: Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 
1343,1351-1352 (4th Cir. 1995), which held the 
employer vicariously liable in part based on 
finding that the supervisor’s rape o f  an employee 
was not outside the scope o f  his employment 
because he used his position and power to facili­
tate the criminal act; and Kauffman v. Allied Signal, 
Inc., 184, which held that a supervisor’s harassment 
was within the scope o f his employment.
13See: Faragher, at 6, citing Burns v. McGregor 
Electronic Industries, Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th 
Cir. 1992), which found the employer-company 
liable where harassment was perpetrated by its 
owner; and Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625,634-635, 
and n. 11 (2nd Cir. 1997), which noted that a 
supervisor may hold a sufficiently high position 
“ in the management hierarchy o f the company for 
his actions to be imputed automatically to the 
employer.”
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An employer can avoid liability 
for a supervisor’s sexual 
harassment by having an 
effective sexual-harassment- 
prevention policy.
Finally, to deflect liability, em­
ployers could argue in their defense 
that they had a policy against sexual 
harassment and the employee failed 
to observe it. This defense was al­
most always successful in those 
cases where the harasser was a co­
worker,14 but it did not always ab­
solve the company when the ha­
rasser was a supervisor.15
Liability is relatively clear in quid 
pro quo cases, when compared to 
hostile-environment cases. Thus, 
plaintiffs have been known to “ spin” 
the facts to fit this theory. Employ­
ers, in the course o f  defending 
themselves in those cases, ended up 
contesting the quid pro quo classifica­
tion and arguing that the plaintiff 
could proceed only under the 
hostile-environment theory, if  at all. 
While having the dispute classified 
as a hostile-environment case did 
not ensure an automatic victory for 
employers, it did make it more diffi­
cult for plaintiffs to prevail. Gaining 
that advantage was not without its 
costs, however. To have a case reclas­
sified, defense lawyers must conduct 
extensive discovery procedures and 
create lengthy briefs on the issue. 
The attorneys’ fees, associated costs, 
and lost productivity from arguing 
over the classification o f a case 
could exceed the total value o f the 
case award.
1998 Supreme Court Rulings
Prior to June 26,1998, when the 
Supreme Court announced its deci­
sions in EUerth and Faragher, the two 
cases seemed to present different 
issues. In EUerth the plaintiff alleged 
that she was led to believe that re­
ceiving a promotion was contingent 
on having an affair with her super­
visor. The plaintiff refused to have
u Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, 123 F.3<1 868 
(6th Cir. Ohio 1997), cert, denied 118 S. Ct.
1039 (1998).
ISSee: Martin v, Cavalier Hotel Corp.; Kauffman v.
Allied Signal, Inc.; Burns v, McGregor Electronic
Industries, Inc,; and Torres v. Pisano,
an affair, but was nevertheless pro­
moted. The question before the 
court was whether such a scenario 
constituted quid pro quo or hostile- 
environment harassment. In Faragher, 
the plaintiff, a lifeguard employed by 
the city o f Boca Raton, Florida, 
brought a hostile-environment case 
against the city. The question before 
the court was whether the city 
could be held liable even if  it did 
not know that the plaintiff had been 
harassed.
In EUerth the court set forth what 
could be described as three hold­
ings. First, the court held that em­
ployers will always be liable for a 
supervisor’s quid pro quo harassment. 
Second, the court held that to estab­
lish a case o f quid pro quo harassment 
a plaintiff must prove that there was 
a tangible loss (e.g. , plaintiff is dis­
charged, demoted, not promoted, or 
reassigned unfavorably). In other 
words, a plaintiff could not, accord­
ing to the court, establish a case o f  
quid pro quo harassment if  she did 
not actually suffer a loss, despite 
having been threatened with a tan­
gible loss. This part o f  the decision 
is a victory for employers because it 
limits the circumstances under 
which they are automatically liable 
for quid pro quo harassment. Third, in 
what has been described as a break 
from the majority o f circuits, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that em­
ployers are liable for the conduct o f  
supervisors in hostile-environment 
situations.
On the surface, this last holding is 
terrifying for employers. It appears 
that an employer who is opposed to 
any form o f  sexual harassment could 
be held liable for the actions o f su­
pervisors who deliberately disobey 
company policy. This is not, how­
ever, the court’s holding, because the 
decision provided employers with 
an affirmative defense. The EUerth 
holding stated that employers could 
avoid vicarious liability if  (1) the 
employer exercised reasonable care
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to prevent and promptly correct any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (2) 
the plaintiff failed to take advantage 
o f any preventive or corrective op­
portunities provided by the em­
ployer or to otherwise avoid harm.
In explaining those defenses 
against company liability, the court 
muddied the water by noting “proof 
that an employer had promulgated 
an anti-harassment policy with 
complaint procedure is not neces­
sary in every instance as a matter o f 
law.” 16 Unfortunately, the court did 
not explain how, in the absence o f 
an effective sexual-harassment 
policy, an employer could satisfy this 
burden.
Regarding the employees actions, 
the court was again less than exact 
when it stated: “While proof that an 
employee failed to fulfill the corre­
sponding obligation o f reasonable 
care to avoid harm is not limited to 
showing any unreasonable failure to 
use any complaint procedure pro­
vided by the employer, a demonstra­
tion o f such failure will normally 
suffice to satisfy the employers bur­
den under the second element o f 
the defense.” 17
In Faragher the court helped de­
fine the defense by addressing the 
issue o f policy dissemination. In 
this case the city o f Boca Raton 
had a sexual-harassment policy but 
failed to disseminate that policy to 
all o f its employees. Moreover, the 
harasser’s supervisor knew o f the 
harassment but failed to stop it. Be­
cause o f the city’s failure to dissemi­
nate the policy and the supervisor’s 
complicity, the court held that the 
city did not exercise reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior. Accord­
ingly, the city could not establish its 
defense.
16Ellerth, at 10.
17Ibid. The affirmative defense, however, is 
available when the supervisor’s harassment 
culminates in a tangible employment action 
(i.e., a quid pro quo case).
No New Problems for Employers
Some analysts and so-called “ harass­
ment consultants” have responded to 
the court’s 1998 rulings by stating 
that: (1) plaintiffs will now have an 
easier time prevailing in sexual- 
harassment cases, and (2) the hold­
ings will be a bonanza for lawyers as 
the courts determine what consti­
tutes an employer’s reasonable care 
to avoid harassment. Both o f these 
points may be true to an extent, 
because employers have lost the 
heretofore effective defense o f “ out­
side the scope o f employment.” In 
addition, employers who do not 
have a policy to eliminate sexual 
harassment but seek to argue that 
they nonetheless exercised reason­
able care will be faced with signifi­
cant legal fees in doing so. Since the 
court did not explain how to estab­
lish such proof o f reasonable care in 
the absence o f an effective company 
policy, those employers probably 
face an expensive, uphill battle.
Employers do not, however, have 
to expose themselves either to the 
risk o f increased liability or astro­
nomical legal-defense fees. In fact, 
employers who legitimately seek to 
end workplace sexual harassment 
should regard the court’s holdings as 
an improvement over the prior state 
o f the law.
Institute a policy! One consid­
erable improvement is that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has made it clear 
that an employer can avoid liability 
for a supervisor’s sexual harassment 
if  the company has an effective 
sexual-harassment-prevention policy 
in place. While the court did not 
definitively define what constitutes 
an effective policy, its Faragher hold­
ing (and common sense) makes it 
fairly clear what is expected. The 
policy should:18
18See: “Employment Alert,” July 1998 edition, 
published by the Chicago law firm o f Altheimer 
and Gray. For information, call or e-mail David 
Ritten at 312-715-4661, «rittend@altheimer.com».
(1) define sexual harassment;
(2) state that the company prohib­
its such conduct;
(3) provide a clear procedure for 
submitting claims, including 
the names o f individuals in­
volved in the resolution 
process;19
(4) state that those who complain 
or cooperate with an investiga­
tion will not suffer retaliation; 
and
(5) be disseminated to all new 
employees when they join  the 
company, reissued to all em­
ployees each year, and posted 
in a conspicuous location in 
the workplace.20
When enforced, such a policy 
will constitute a company’s strongest 
defense because it will show the 
firm’s reasonable care in preventing 
sexual harassment. Moreover, em­
ployees who refuse to lodge com­
plaints would be failing to take ad­
vantage o f a preventive measure 
established by the company. Alter­
natively, a company that has a policy 
yet fails to investigate complaints, 
does not stop harassment, or retali­
ates against complaining employees 
will not prevail because its policy 
would not fulfill the conditions 
required for reasonable care. An 
employee who sued under those 
latter conditions without first lodg­
ing a complaint would not be found 
to have acted unreasonably.
Shortcomings for Employers
As stated earlier, the court’s current 
holding focuses on a company-
19A policy that requires employees to report 
incidents to their immediate supervisor will not 
be considered effective when the supervisor is 
the harasser. Large companies may consider 
alternative reporting strategies, such as establish­
ing a sexual-harassment hotline. In any event, the 
policy should include a procedure that allows the 
alleged victim to bypass the harasser if the ha­
rasser normally has a role in the company’s 
pohcy-enactment process.
20Some firms require that employees sign an
acknowledgment that they have read and under­
stand the company policy.
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sponsored sexual-harassment policy 
and whether the employer and the 
employee complied with it. Since a 
plaintiff’s lawyer probably will not 
risk scarce resources on litigating 
the effectiveness o f  such a policy, the 
court’s holdings strengthen an 
employer’s defense. Although the 
EUerth and Faragher decisions greatly 
reduce the threat o f liability for a 
company that can document its 
adherence to and enforcement o f a 
sexual-harassment policy, the court’s 
holdings still raise two potential 
problems for employers.
Burden o f  proof. The first 
problem is that the burden o f prov­
ing that the company acted reason­
ably (and the plaintiff did not) rests 
on the employer, and not the em­
ployee. The employer must prove to 
a jury using a preponderance o f 
evidence (e.g., testimony, docu­
ments, videos) that its policy was 
effective and the employee acted 
unreasonably. On the other hand, 
the plaintiff’s lawyers do not need 
to prove anything. They simply have 
to shoot holes in the employer’s 
arguments. This idea is exemplified 
in the criminal-law standard o f in­
nocent until proven guilty. How­
ever, after reviewing 1998’s sexual- 
harassment cases, one could argue 
that the employer is guilty until it 
demonstrates innocence. Alterna­
tively, if  the burden were reversed, 
the plaintiff would have to prove 
that the company acted unreason­
ably and the employee was reason­
able. It is much more difficult for 
employers to prove their assertions 
than to contest those o f the plaintiff.
What’s “ unreasonable” ? The 
other area where the court could 
have been more employer-friendly 
involves the plaintiff’s obligation to 
use the employers’ established poli­
cies unless doing so would be “ un­
reasonable.” The court’s use o f the 
word “ unreasonable” is, we believe, 
unfortunate for employers. The 
word “ unreasonable” is not as de­
finitive a term as, for example, “ fu­
tile.” An employer with solid poli­
cies and procedures in place could 
proceed confidently because a jury 
could not find that using the com­
pany policy was “ futile.” The same 
employer may, however, have trouble 
proving to a jury that a plaintiff 
who suffered egregious harassment 
acted improperly by failing to fol­
low procedures that seem “ reason­
able.” We predict that the relevance 
o f this difference will be seen as the 
lower courts clarify this standard.
Despite the difficult conditions 
presented to employers by the 
burden-of-proof issue and the court’s 
failure to use something akin to the 
futility standard, the EUerth and 
Faragher decisions do not create 
obstacles that employers should fear. 
Rather, employers should regard 
those court decisions as positive 
precedents that clarify the law and 
provide guidance for establishing a 
viable defense against harassment 
charges that arise when supervisors 
violate established company policy.
Oncale: Not a Victory for Employees
In Oncale u Sundowner Offshore Ser­
vices, the plaintiff was the smallest 
member o f an all-male crew work­
ing on an offshore oil rig. The other 
members o f the crew repeatedly 
taunted the plaintiff, and over time 
the taunts became more extreme. 
Finally, the plaintiff alleged he was 
attacked in the shower and a bar o f  
soap was shoved into his anus. After 
complaints to the oil rig’s managers 
did not eliminate the conduct, the 
plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal 
court. The case was dismissed be­
cause the case was filed in the 5th 
Circuit— the only court o f appeals 
to hold that same-sex sexual harass­
ment is not prohibited by Title 
VII.21 In upholding the district- 
court’s dismissal, a panel o f the
21 Garcia u E lf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 
446,451-452 (5th Cir. 1994).
5th Circuit essentially begged the 
U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the 
decision that it was bound to fol­
low.22 The Supreme Court did just 
that. It rejected the notion that 
there was no cause o f action for 
same-sex sexual harassment and 
held that the plaintiff could make 
such a case if  the conduct was moti­
vated by the sex o f the plaintiff. The 
case was sent back to district court 
for adjudication consistent with the 
Supreme Court holding.
The court’s holding elicited reac­
tions that were similar to those that 
followed the EUerth and Faragher 
cases. That is, media analysts de­
clared a victory for employees at the 
expense o f employers, while civil- 
rights advocates applauded the 
court’s decision.23
We believe, however, that the 
analysts, commentators, and civil- 
rights advocates are wrong to see 
this as an untrammeled victory for 
employees. Oncale did not establish a 
new cause o f action; Oncale created 
a more stringent burden-of-proof 
requirement that could reduce the 
probability that the employee will 
prevail in sex-harassment cases.
In fact, we think that the Su­
preme Court’s definition o f sexual 
harassment in Oncale will make it 
more difficult than ever for plaintiffs
22Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 
F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
23Media reaction to the Oncale case was clear 
from the headlines: “ High Court Widens Work­
place Claims in Harassment,” New York Times, 
March 5 ,1998 ;“ Ruling Puts Workplace Behav­
ior Under a Harsher Spotlight,”  USA Today, 
March 5,1998; “ Harassment, N ot Gender; an 
Important Victory for Civil Rights,” Bergen 
Record Headline, March 8,1998; and “Justices 
Broaden Bias Law, Add Same-Sex Harassment,”
Columbus Dispatch, March 5,1998. Civil-rights 
advocates found favor with the court s decision 
as well: Steven R . Shapiro, A CLU legal director, 
“ This decision is a victory for all Americans, gay 
or straight, male or female,” Detroit News, March 
25,1998; and Matt Coles, gay-rights litigant for 
the A C LU ’s gay-rights project,“ [the courts 
message is] male or female, gay or straight, 
nobody should have to face sexual harassment 
when they go to work in the morning,”
New York Times, March 5,1998.
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to prevail. In Doe v. City of Belleville, 
the 7th Circuit implied that severe 
or pervasive conduct o f  a sexual 
nature was per se unlawful.24 The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected 
this analysis and held that same-sex 
sexual harassment was unlawful only 
if  the conduct was “ because o f sex.” 
Such a holding is a departure from 
how sexual-harassment cases were 
analyzed previously. To illustrate this 
point, it is necessary to examine the 
three types o f sex-related harass­
ment or discrimination that can give 
rise to causes o f action: ( i )  sexual 
discrimination; (2) sexual harass­
ment; and (3) gender harassment.
Sexual discrimination. Sexual 
discrimination, expressly forbidden 
by Title VII, occurs when an em­
ployee’s terms and conditions o f 
employment are negatively affected 
because o f the employee’s gender.25 
Accordingly, an employee who is 
discharged or not promoted because 
she is a woman has a claim for 
sexual discrimination.
Sexual harassment. We have 
already discussed sexual harassment 
in its two forms, quid pro quo and 
hostile environment.
Gender harassment. Gender 
harassment is similar to hostile- 
environment sexual harassment in 
that a violation occurs if  the em­
ployer’s conduct is severe and perva­
sive. There is, however, a difference 
between sexual harassment and gen­
der harassment. The conduct that 
results in a gender-harassment claim 
is not sexual in nature. Instead, gen­
der harassment exists when employ­
ers mistreat employees because o f 
their gender. (For a more detailed 
explanation o f that difference, see 
the box on this page.) Thus, while it 
is lawful for a company’s supervisors 
to scream and yell at any or all o f 
their employees (i.e., to be an
24Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 
1997).
2:>The terms “ sex” and “ gender” are used inter­
changeably.
“ equal-opportunity boor”),26 it is 
unlawful to scream and yell at just 
the women or just the men because 
o f their gender.27
Motivation Is Key in 
Sexual-Discrimination 
and Gender-Harassment Cases
A supervisor’s motivation is the key 
element in sexual-discrimination and 
gender-harassment claims. This is 
true because the conduct that gives 
rise to such claims is not per se un­
lawful. For example, any employee 
can bring a sexual-discrimination 
claim upon being terminated. To 
prevail, however, the employee must 
prove that she (or he) was discharged 
because she was a woman (or a man). 
Similarly, an employee can bring a 
gender-harassment claim if his su­
pervisor regularly cursed at him and 
embarrassed him in front o f clients. 
Such conduct, however, is only un­
lawful if  the alleged conduct is moti­
vated by the employee’s gender. Sub­
jecting an employee to harassment 
that is not o f a sexual nature is ac­
tionable only if  the employee can 
prove that harassment occurred be­
cause o f the employee’s gender. Thus, 
if  the employee is a woman, she must 
prove that all women were treated 
this way, and that the men were not.
Conduct Is Key in 
Sexual-Harassment Cases
Unwelcome sexual conduct has al­
ways been considered per se unlawful,
26In Kranz v. Port Authority, 55 FEP Cases 1315 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), an employee alleged harassment 
against a supervisor who swore at the employee, 
made negative racial remarks, and opened the em­
ployee s locked desk. The court found the harass­
ment was not unlawful because the supervisor 
treated all o f his employees in a similar manner.
27See: Cline v. G.E. Auto Lease. N ot all courts 
recognize gender harassment, however. In Isaacson 
v. Keck, Mahin, & Cate, 61 FEP Cases 1145 (N.D. 
111. 1993), the court held that a woman could not 
make out a “ harassment” charge if she failed to 
allege any conduct o f a sexual nature. To us, this 
ruling is inconsistent with the fact that employees 
can successfully allege harassment based on other 
personal and individual characteristics such as race, 
religion, national origin, age, or disability.
Gender Harassment versus 
Sexual Harassment
The best way to distinguish between 
gender and sexual harassment may be 
with examples from relevant cases. In 
Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370 
(9th Cir. 1990), a woman complained that 
her male manager (1) made ongoing 
comments about her and other female 
employees’ breasts, buttocks, and 
physical appearances, and (2) established 
dress standards so that he could examine 
female employees’ legs. Because this 
conduct was sexual in nature, the plaintiff 
was able to maintain a cause of action for 
sexual harassment.
Alternatively, in Cline v. G.E. Auto 
Lease, Inc., 55 FEP Cases 498 (N.D. III. 
1991), the plaintiffs supervisor repeatedly 
verbally insulted the plaintiff, Phyllis Cline, 
but the insults were not of a sexual 
nature. The supervisor also hit Cline on 
the arm and on one occasion, in front of 
her co-workers, commanded Cline to “sit 
your ass down.” Moreover, the supervisor 
also treated other women harshly. Be­
cause his comments were not sexual in 
nature, the court held that the plaintiff 
could not establish a cause of sexual 
harassment. It was possible, however, for 
the plaintiff to make out a case of gender 
harassment if she could prove that she 
was harassed because she was a 
woman.—D.S. and J.B.T.
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Unwelcome conduct of a 
sexual nature that is severe 
or pervasive should he 
perse unlawful, regardless 
of the gender of the harasser 
and the
provided such conduct is severe and 
pervasive. For example, an employee 
can establish a claim o f sexual ha­
rassment by proving that a supervi­
sor (1) sought to begin or rekindle 
a relationship by stating or implying 
that such a relationship was a condi­
tion o f employment; or (2) repeat­
edly made unwelcome sexual ad­
vances, requested sexual favors, or 
engaged in other verbal or physical 
conduct o f a sexual nature. In such 
cases the supervisor’s motivation is 
irrelevant. Engaging in such con­
duct, regardless o f the motivation, 
violates the law.
The Oncale Departure
The Oncale case seems to represent a 
discontinuity in sexual-harassment 
law. In Oncale the court held that to 
prove same-sex sexual harassment
the plaintiff “must always prove that 
the conduct is not merely tinged 
with offensive sexual connotations, 
but actually constituted discrimina­
tion because o f sex.”28 Thus, similar 
to gender discrimination, the court 
held that to prove same-sex sexual 
harassment the plaintiff needs to 
show both conduct and motivation. 
To justify this departure from past 
approaches to sexual-harassment 
cases, the court explained that in 
male-female sexual-harassment cases 
one may assume that gender is the 
motivation and therefore it is not 
always necessary to prove that the 
conduct is because o f sex. In same- 
sex cases, however (according to the 
court), this assumption can not be 
made if  the alleged harassers are 
heterosexual. Accordingly, to prove 
their case, plaintiffs need to prove 
that gender motivated the harassers.
Proving motivation is a difficult 
burden to satisfy, as demonstrated by 
the Oncale case. The conduct in 
Oncale was clearly egregious, but 
was it because o f sex? This element 
may be impossible for the plaintiff 
to prove. There were no women on 
the oil rig and Oncale was the only 
person harassed. How, then, can 
Oncale prove that his co-workers 
were motivated by gender when no 
other man was harassed, and when 
there were no women to be ha­
rassed? If the trial-court jury follows 
the law as interpreted by the court, 
Oncale should lose.
A new defense* By way o f pro­
viding guidance for determining 
motivation, the court instructed fact 
finders to look at how harassers treat 
members o f both sexes in a mixed- 
sex workplace. The implication o f  
this instruction is clear. A plaintiff 
could not make a case o f same-sex 
harassment if  members o f the oppo­
2HDoe and Doe k C ity of Belleville. 1997 U.S.
17940, citing Andrews v. C ity o f Philadelphia, 895 
F.2d 1469,1482 (3rd Cir. 1990).
site sex were treated in the same 
manner. Thus, a male employee 
whose male supervisor taunts the 
employee about sex and then grabs 
the employee’s buttocks and rubs his 
chest likely will not have a case o f  
sexual harassment if  the supervisor 
also grabs a female subordinate’s 
buttocks and rubs her chest. If the 
man in this example does not have a 
case o f sexual harassment because 
the conduct is not motivated by 
gender, then it stands to reason that 
the female in this example does not 
have a case, either. Thus, the Oncale 
court created a new defense to 
charges o f sexual harassment, what 
we call the “ equal opportunity 
sexual harasser.” Such a defense 
could turn what had traditionally 
been actionable conduct into lawful 
behavior.
For example, posters o f naked 
women in mixed-sex workplaces 
have in the past exposed employers 
to claims o f harassment by women 
employees. Now, the employer may 
be able to insulate itself by putting 
up such pictures o f men, too. Addi­
tionally, explicit discussions o f sex 
that used to be taboo may no longer 
be unlawful as long as both men and 
women are parties to the conversa­
tion. Finally, supervisors who wish to 
grope members o f the opposite sex 
now may shield themselves and the 
employer from subsequent liability 
by groping all employees. Whether 
such a defense would hold up in 
court remains to be seen.
The law is unclear. The sudden 
appearance o f what appears to be an 
equal-opportunity-harasser defense 
does not mean that sexual harass­
ment is no longer an issue. While 
such a defense is consistent with the 
Oncale decision, no judicial authority 
direcdy supports it, and relying on 
such an approach doesn’t make good 
business sense. First, because the 
lower courts will establish the valid­
ity o f the defense as they grapple
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with Oncale, employers who invoke 
it will likely have to litigate the 
theory through several different 
levels o f  the court system. The cost 
o f such litigation would, in most 
cases, exceed the potential liability 
o f the original claim. Second, the 
equal-opportunity harasser, like the 
equal-opportunity boor, damages 
employee relations and will likely 
result in low productivity and high 
turnover. Thus, companies’ prob­
lematic supervisors should be elimi­
nated as a matter o f course, and not 
protected or otherwise tolerated. In 
conclusion, we think that Oncale is 
simply bad law. It seems that the 
court was so concerned with not 
extending the civil-rights law that it 
created a standard that makes no 
sense. We’re confident that, sooner 
or later, it will be corrected.
The Best Policies Reflect What the 
Law Should Be
It’s clear to us that unwelcome con­
duct o f a sexual nature that is severe 
or pervasive should be per se unlaw­
ful, regardless o f the gender o f the 
harasser and the harassed. Such a 
standard would discourage putative 
equal-opportunity harassers and 
ensure that people like Oncale win 
their cases. A clear standard would 
also provide employers with an easy 
method for determining whether a 
complaint was unlawful. The em­
ployer would simply ask the em­
ployee to describe in detail the type 
o f conduct that occurred. If the 
severe or pervasive conduct is sexual 
in nature, the employer would know 
that the allegations, if  true, consti­
tute unlawful harassment— period.
If the allegations consist o f non- 
sexual conduct, the employer would 
need to explore why that conduct 
occurred. Does the supervisor treat 
all members o f one sex the same 
way? How are members o f the op­
posite sex treated? If the supervisor 
yells at one employee, but treats the
other employees o f the same gender 
with fairness and respect, then there 
probably is no unlawful harassment. 
If, however, the supervisor makes 
comments about the employee’s 
body or sex life, the conduct is 
probably unlawful— if it is deemed 
severe.
Following a standard o f per se 
unlawfulness eliminates the equal- 
opportunity-harasser defense and 
other gray areas in the current law, 
thus making it easier for employers 
to police their own ranks.
Naysayers. Some people would 
argue that making severe or perva­
sive sexual conduct per se unlawful 
invites problems. One school o f 
thought is that such a distinction 
would turn Title VII into a general 
civility code. We believe that such is 
not the case. As the Oncale court 
explained, the law “ forbids only 
behavior so objectively offensive to 
alter the conditions o f the victim’s 
employment that inquiry requires 
careful consideration o f the social 
context in which particular behav­
ior occurs and is experienced by its 
target.”29
Common sense and an appropri­
ate sensitivity to social context will 
enable courts and juries to distin­
guish between simple teasing or 
roughhousing among members o f 
the same sex, and conduct which a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position would find severely hostile 
or abusive.30 We believe that the 
court is correct—juries can see the 
difference between conduct that is 
offensive and that which is boorish.
A second, unrelated argument is 
that courts and juries cannot distin­
guish between sexual and non- 
sexual conduct. Oncale notwith­
standing, this is also not the case.
In Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.,31 a male
29 Oncale, at 1003
30Ibid.
31Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 
1997).
plaintiff alleged that he was sexually 
harassed by his male co-worker. As 
evidence o f the harassment, the 
employee alleged that the co­
worker repeatedly said to the em­
ployee, “ suck my dick.” In dismissing 
the case the 7th Circuit held that 
the conduct was not sexual, that the 
employees hated each other, and 
that the words were used as an in­
sult, not as a come on or a threat 
o f rape.
What’s Wrong with PerSe?
If unwelcome severe or pervasive 
sexual conduct should be per se un­
lawful, why did the U.S. Supreme 
Court refuse to adopt such a stan­
dard? We think that the answer lies 
in the theory behind sexual harass­
ment, which is based not on statute 
but on a logical extension o f Title 
VII. That leap o f logic is grounded 
on Title VII’s ban on discrimination 
“because o f sex.” Thus, sexual ha­
rassment is unlawful only if  it is 
viewed as discrimination because o f 
sex. To make sexual conduct per se 
unlawful based on Title VII is a leap 
that the Supreme Court refused to 
take. That refusal, however, results in 
an unclear and maybe unworkable 
law (as exemplified by Oncale) .
We contend that the court 
should have either taken the leap or 
reversed Meritor and held that Title 
VII, in fact, doesn’t have anything to 
do with issues o f sexual harassment. 
Reversing Meritor (an unlikely 
event) would probably force the 
U.S. Congress to pass an explicit law 
on the topic. We believe such an 
outcome would be more desirable 
than the one that employers and 
employees alike face today. Until 
then, however, employers can limit 
liability by (1) establishing a sexual- 
and gender-harassment policy;
(2) enforcing the policy; and
(3) treating unwelcome supervisor— 
employee sexual conduct as per se 
unlawful. CQ
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